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Abstract
Online advertising fuels the (seemingly) free internet. How-
ever, although users can access a website free of charge, there
is a heavy cost on their privacy due to the deployed user
tracking. To make matters worse, in the current ad ecosystem
there is no transparency: apart from users, publishers and ad-
vertisers, there are numerous dubious middlemen exploiting
the ad revenues and the users’ data beyond anyone’s control.
In this paper, we propose THEMIS: a novel privacy-by-
design ad platform that is decentralized and requires zero
trust from both users and advertisers. THEMIS (i) provides
auditability to all participants, (ii) rewards users for inter-
acting with ads, and (iii) allows advertisers to verify the
performance and billing reports of their ad campaigns.
To assess the feasibility and practicability of our approach,
we implemented a prototype using smart contracts and zero-
knowledge schemes. Preliminary results of our evaluation
show that during ad reward payouts, THEMIS can support
more than 7M concurrent users on a single side-chain, a
number that grows linearly by running multiple instances of
THEMIS in parallel.
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1 Introduction
Digital advertising is the most popular way for funding web-
sites, despite the many other alternative monetization systems
that have been proposed [1–4]. Digital advertising revenues
in the U.S. reached $57.9 billion during the first six months
of 2019 [5], the highest revenue in history for the first half
of any year, and a 17% year-over-year increase over the first
half of 2018.
Web advertising though has fundamental flaws, including
market fragmentation [6, 7], rampant fraud [8–14], and un-
precedented privacy harm [15–18]. Further, more and more
web users ignore annoying ads (click-through-rate: 2% on
average [19]) that are trying to steal their attention [20] or
even completely opt-out web advertising by using ad-blockers
(47% of internet users globally, as of today) [21], thus costing
publishers millions of dollars in ad revenues every year [22].
Academia and industry have responded by designing new
monitization systems. These systems generally emphasize user
choice, privacy protections, fraud prevention, or performance
improvements. Brave Ads [23], Privad [24], and Adnostic [25]
are three such recent systems. Despite the contributions of
these systems, they have significant shortcomings that have
limited their adoption. These systems (i) do not scale, (ii) re-
quire the user to trust central authorities within the system
to process ad transactions, or (iii) do not allow advertisers
to sufficiently measure campaign performance.
To make matters worse, as pointed out in [26], current
advertising systems (iv) lack auditability: the ad network
exclusively determines how much advertisers will be charged,
as well as the revenue share the publishers will get. Malicious
ad networks can overcharge advertisers or underpay publish-
ers. What is more, (v) another issue is non-repudiation as
bills cannot be adequately justified by the ad network and
malicious advertisers can deny actual views/clicks and ask
for refund.
1.1 Our Approach
To address these issues, in this paper, we propose THEMIS:
the first decentralized ad platform that uses a side-chain
design pattern and smart contracts to eliminate centralized
ad network management. THEMIS eliminates the middlemen
of the current ad ecosystem and at the same time requires zero
trust from the participating entities allowing any of them
to verify the proper execution of the protocol. THEMIS
is designed to be practical for both users and advertisers.
It protects user privacy while — following the paradigm
of Brave Rewards [27] — it rewards users for viewing ads.
Such user rewards policy aims to compensate users for the
attention they give while interacting with ads. Existing, real
world, reward schemes have triggered high user engagement,
thus producing tremendous click-through-rates to their ad
platforms (on average 14% compared to the 2% of the current
ad ecosystem) [28].
THEMIS effectively addresses the auditability and non-
repudiation issues pointed out above by providing a cryp-
tographic tool-chest so participants can verify that every-
body is following correctly the protocol. At the same time,
THEMIS provides the advertisers with the necessary feed-
back regarding the performance of their ad campaigns but
without compromising the end-user privacy. By guaranteeing
the computational integrity of this reporting, advertisers can
accurately learn how many users viewed their ads, but without
learning exactly who.
1.2 Contributions
In summary, we make the following contributions:
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(1) System. We propose THEMIS: a privacy-preserving
advertising platform that compensates users for their
attention and rewards them for ad viewing. Contrary
to existing proposals, our system is decentralized and
leverages smart contracts to orchestrate reward pay-
ments between users and advertisers. This way, our
platform avoids relying on a trusted central authority.
(2) Reporting integrity. We leverage a partial homomor-
phic encryption scheme to (i) calculate ad payouts
without revealing user interactions and (ii) provide ev-
ery entity in the system a way to verify the validity of
the payouts. To provide advertisers with the necessary
feedback regarding the performance of their ad cam-
paigns, we leverage a multiparty computation protocol
to provide advertisers with reporting integrity while
preserving the privacy of the users’ ad viewing.
(3) Prototype implementation. To assess the feasibility of
our approach, we implement a prototype of our system
in Rust and Solidity languages. We provide the source
code of THEMIS publicly1.
(4) Comparison of the different private payment protocols.
In the context of deploying THEMIS, we compare the
performance of recently proposed zero-knowledge mech-
anisms that provide confidential and anonymous pay-
ments in Ethereum-based blockchains. We present com-
prehensive measurements of real-world deployments.
(5) Performance evaluation. We evaluate the performance
of our system by conducting comprehensive scale-up
experiments. As an optimization to the THEMIS proto-
col, we leverage the batching property of the on-chain
confidential payment protocols tested above. Based
on our preliminary measurements, we present how
THEMIS can support around 7M concurrent users
on a single side-chain, a number that grows linearly by
running multiple instances of THEMIS in parallel.
2 Background
In this section, we provide the reader with the necessary
knowledge regarding the techniques and mechanisms lever-
aged throughout the paper; we also describe why and how
THEMIS uses them.
2.1 Proof of Authority Blockchains
THEMIS relies on a blockchain with smart contract function-
ality to provide a decentralized ad platform. Smart contracts
enable us to perform all payments without trusting on a
central authority. Ethereum Mainnet [29] is a such popu-
lar smart contract-based blockchain. However, due to its
low transaction throughput, the high gas costs, and the
overall poor scalability, in THEMIS, we chose to use a
Proof-of-Authority (PoA) blockchain instead.
Consensus protocols constitute the basis of any distributed
system. The decision on which consensus mechanism to use
1Link to the open sourced project is omitted in this anonymous
submission.
affects the properties, scalability and assumptions of the ser-
vices build on top of the distributed system [30]. A PoA
blockchain consists of a distributed ledger that relies on con-
sensus achieved by a permissioned pool of validator nodes.
PoA validators can rely on fast consensus protocols such
as IBFT/IBFT2.0 [31, 32] and Clique [33], which result in
faster minted blocks and thus PoA can reach higher transac-
tion throughput than traditional PoW based blockchains. As
opposed to traditional, permissionless blockchains (such as
Bitcoin [34] and Ethereum [29]), the number of nodes partic-
ipating in the consensus is relatively small and all nodes are
authenticated. In our case the set of validators can consist of
publishers.
Private input transactions on PoA blockchains: Providing
private input functionality in smart contracts requires the
inputs to be encrypted with all validator’s public keys. By
encrypting both inputs and outputs with validator’s public
keys, the parameters are private from readers of the public
information, when at the same time validator nodes can run
the smart contracts correctly and achieve consensus. To ease
readability, we refer to the public keys of validators as a
single one, pk𝒱 .
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
Confidentiality: THEMIS uses an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme to calculate the ads payouts for each
user, while keeping the user behavior (e.g. ad clicks) pri-
vate. Given a public-private key-pair pk, sk, the encryption
scheme is defined by three functions: first, the encrypt func-
tion, where given a public key and a message, outputs a
ciphertext, 𝐶 = Encpk,𝑀 . Secondly, the decrypt function,
that given a ciphertext and a private key, outputs a decrypted
message, 𝑀 = Decsk, 𝐶. And finally, the signing function,
where given a message and a secret key, outputs a signature
on the message, 𝑆 = Signsk,𝑀 . The additive homomorphic
property guarantees that the addition of two ciphertexts,
𝐶1 = Encpk,𝑀1, 𝐶2 = Encpk,𝑀2 encrypted under the same
key, results in the addition of the encryption of its messages,
more precisely,
𝐶1 + 𝐶2 = Encpk,𝑀1 +𝑀2. (1)
Some examples of such encryption algorithms are ElGamal
[35] or Paillier [36] encryption schemes.
Integrity: To prove correct decryption, THEMIS leverages
zero knowledge proofs [37] which allow an entity (i.e., the
prover) to prove to a different entity (i.e., the verifier) that
a certain statement is true over a private input without
disclosing any other information from that input other than
whether statement is true or not. We denote proofs with the
letter Π, and use Π.Verify to denote verification of a proof.
Distribution of trust: THEMIS distributes trust to gener-
ate a public-private key-pair for each ad campaign, under
which the sensitive information is encrypted. Thus, it uses
a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol to share the
knowledge of the secret. This allows a group of participants
to distributively generate the key-pair pkT, skT where each
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participants has a share of the private key, skT,𝑖, and no
participant ever gains knowledge of the full private key, skT.
The resulting key-pair is a 𝑘 − 𝑛 threshold key-pair, which
requires at least 𝑘 out of the 𝑛 participants that distribu-
tively generated the key, to interact during the decryption or
signing protocols. We follow a similar distributed key gener-
ation (DKG) protocol as presented by Schindler et al. [38],
which relies on smart contracts to decentralize public-key
infrastructure [39]. To verify the correctness of the resulting
decryption, we follow the protocol presented in [40].
In order to chose this selected group of key generation par-
ticipants in a distributed way, THEMIS leverages Verifiable
Random Functions (VRFs) [41, 42]. In general, VRFs enable
users to generate a random number and prove its randomness.
In THEMIS, we use VRFs to select a random pool of users
and generate the distributed keys. Given a public-private
key-pair VRF.pk,VRF.sk, VRFs are defined by one function:
random number generation, which outputs a random number,
VRF.Rand and a zero knowledge proof of correct generation,
ΠVRF,
VRF.Rand,ΠVRF = VRF.RandGenVRF.sk, 𝜖, (2)
where 𝜖 is a random seed.
Confidential payments for account-based blockchains: Confi-
dential payments on account-based blockchains allow transfer
of assets between accounts without disclosing the amount
of assets being transferred or the balance of the accounts.
Additionally, the sender can prove the correctness of the
payment (i.e., prove that there was no double spending).
Confidential payments have drawn a lot of interest in both
academia [43, 44] and industry [45, 46] recently. Throughout
the paper, we consider the AZTEC [47] and the Zether [48]
protocols as confidential payment protocols for THEMIS.
The AZTEC protocol implements a toolkit and a set of
smart contracts for building confidential assets on top of
the Ethereum Virtual Machine[49]. The AZTEC protocol
defines a commitment scheme and zero-knowledge proofs for
verifying and validating transactions without disclosing the
balance of the asset transaction. An important feature of
AZTEC is that it enables the prover to generate proof of
correct payments in batches, which amortizes the costs of
multiple payments.
The Zether protocol uses Sigma-Bulletproofs and one-out-
of-many proofs to achieve confidential and anonymous pay-
ments in account-based blockchains. Zether does not provide
batching of payment proof validations, which means that the
time for settling payments grows linearly with the number of
payments issued.
3 Threat Model and Goals
In this section, we introduce the main actors of our system,
the threat model and the design principles we took into ac-
count while designing THEMIS and how existing mechanisms
work and compare with our approach.
3.1 Main Actors
PoA validator nodes: THEMIS leverages a PoA side-chain
that relies on consensus achieved by a pool of permissioned
validator nodes. The validators’ role is of a miner of the
side-chain, where they need to evaluate the smart contracts
and mine new blocks.
Campaign Facilitators (CF): A CF interacts with advertisers
to agree on an ad policy of their preference and deploys the
smart contracts in the PoA side-chain. In Addition, the CF
is responsible for performing the confidential and verifiable
payments to the users.
Advertisers: The advertisers agree with the Campaign Facil-
itator the policies for each ad campaign they want to launch.
They receive an anonymized feedback for the performance
of their campaigns which integrity they can verify. Finally,
they interact with the PoA chain to verify that the amount
they are being charged for the users’ ad rewards indeed
corresponds to their interactions.
Users: The users interact with the ads the advertising plat-
form renders to them and generate interaction vectors. Next,
they interact with the PoA chain so their rewards are com-
puted and credited. THEMIS users may also participate in
a consensus pool where they interact with other users in a
peer-to-peer way. We refer to them as consensus participants
(Con.Part).
3.2 Goals and Comparison with Alternatives
The goal of this paper is to design (i) a decentralized and
(ii) trustless ad platform that (iii) is private-by-design while,
at the same time, (iv) rewards users for the attention they
give while viewing ads and (v) provides metrics for the ad
campaigns of the advertisers. The key system properties we
focus on while designing THEMIS, include privacy (for both
user interactions and advertiser policies), decentralization
and auditability (by providing verifiable rewards billing and
campaign reporting integrity) and scalability:
(1) Privacy. In the context of a sustainable ad ecosystem,
we define privacy as the ability for not only users, but
also advertisers to use our system without disclosing
any critical information:
(a) For the user, privacy means being able to interact
(i.e., view, click) with ads without revealing their in-
terests/preferences to advertisers or eavesdroppers.
In THEMIS, we preserve the privacy of the user
not only when they are interacting with ads but
also when they claim the corresponding rewards for
these ads.
(b) For the advertisers, privacy means that they are
able to setup ad campaigns without revealing any
policies (i.e., what is the reward of each of their ad)
to the prying eyes of their competitors. To achieve
that, THEMIS keeps these ad policies confidential
throughout the whole process, while it enables users
to provably claim these rewards.
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(2) Decentralization and auditability. Existing ad plat-
forms [23–25] require a central authority to manage and
orchestrate the proper execution of the protocol, either
in terms of user privacy or billing. Although, as nicely
pointed out in [26], what if this (considered as trusted)
entity censors users by denying or transferring incor-
rect amount of rewards? What if it attempts to charge
advertisers more than what they should pay based on
users’ ad interactions? What if the advertising policies
are not applied as agreed with the advertisers when
setting up ad campaigns? One of the primary goals
of our system is to be decentralized and trustless. To
achieve this, THEMIS leverages a Proof-of-Authority
(PoA) blockchain with smart contract functionality.
To provide auditability, THEMIS leverages use zero-
knowledge proofs to ensure the correctness and validity
of both billing and reporting thus allowing all actors
to verify the authenticity of the statements and the
performed operations.
(3) Scalability. Ad platforms need to be able to scale seam-
lessly and serve millions of users. However, important
proposed systems fail to achieve this [24, 25]. In this
paper, we consider scalability an important aspect af-
fecting the practicability of a system. THEMIS needs
to not only serve ads in a privacy preserving way to
millions of users but also finalize the payments related
to their ad rewards.
3.3 Threat Model
In THEMIS, we assume computationally bounded adver-
saries capable of snooping communications, performing re-
playing attacks, forging signatures or cheating by not follow-
ing the protocol in an honest way.
One such adversary may act as CF aiming to collect more
processing fees than agreed at the cost of user rewards or
advertiser refunds. We assume that such adversary can control
any node of the system but (following the limitations of the
underlying PoA) not the majority of the validator nodes.
Other adversary may aim to breach privacy of the user
and snoop the interactions of the user with the ads. This
user information could reveal interests, political/religious
preferences, that can later be sold or used beyond the control
of the user [50–53]. We assume that such adversary can
control any node in the system but cannot control all users.
We assume that it controls at most 𝑘 of the 𝑛 randomly
selected users that are part of the consensus pool (due to the
threshold key they hold, see Section 2.2).
There may be also adversaries that will try to break the
confidentiality of the advertisers’ agreed ad policies. Revealing
such information could disclose rewarding strategies and
give an advantage to competitors. We assume that such an
adversary may act as a user and/or advertiser in the protocol
but cannot control the campaign facilitators or the PoA
validators. Table 1 summarizes the assumptions required for
each goal of our system.
Entities User privacy Ad-policy privacy Auditability
CF No Yes No
PoA Validators No Yes Majority
Con.Part 𝑘-out-of-𝑛 No No
Table 1: Trust assumptions of the key actors of THEMIS pro-
tocol related to each of the properties our scheme offers.
Out-of-scope Attacks: We acknowledge that client-side fraud
is a real problem in current ad ecosystem [10, 11, 54] and
the majority (if not all) the alternatives [24, 25, 55]. In this
paper, we do not attempt to address this problem. There is
a significant body of research already aiming to detect and
deal with such attacks (i.e., bot clicks, click farms, automated
agents) [56–59] and therefore we consider these attacks be-
yond the scope of this work. To mitigate their impact and
similar to other rewarding ad platforms [27], in THEMIS,
we introduce a cap on the reward requests per day per user.
4 System Overview
In this section, we present in detail the decentralized and
privacy-preserving advertising system. We begin with a straw-
man approach to describe the basic principles of the system.
We build on this straw-man approach and, step-by-step, we
introduce the decentralized ad platform, THEMIS. For pre-
sentation purposes, in the rest of this paper, we assume that
users interact with THEMIS through a web browser, al-
though users may interact with it through a mobile app in
the exact same way.
4.1 A Straw-man Approach
Our straw-man approach is the first step towards a privacy-
preserving and trustless online advertising system. Our goal
at this stage is to provide a mechanism for advertisers to
create ad campaigns and to be correctly charged when their
respective ads are delivered to users. In addition, the system
aims at keeping track of the ads viewed by users, so that (i)
advertisers can have feedback about their ad campaigns and
(ii) users can be rewarded for interacting with ads. All these
goals should be achieved while preserving ad policy privacy
and user privacy.
We assume three different roles in this system: (i) the
users, (ii) the advertisers, and (iii) an Ad Campaigns Manager
(CM). The users are incentivized to view and interact with
ads created by the advertisers. The CM is responsible (a)
for orchestrating the protocol, (b) for handling the ad views
reporting and finally (c) for calculating the rewards that
need to be paid to users according to the policies defined
by the advertisers. Table 2 summarizes the notation used
throughout this section.
4.1.1 Privacy-preserving Ad Personalization
To perform privacy-preserving ad personalization, in our
system we follow the paradigm of Adnostic [25] and the ad
platform of Brave Ads [23] which has been in continuous
operation since 2019 [55]. This way, in our system, the user
downloads (e.g., periodically or while on WiFi) from the ad
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Notation Description
EncVec Encrypted vector of ad clicks
Aggr.Res Encrypted result of the aggregate calculated
over the EncVec vector
Dec.Aggr.Res Result of the decryption of Aggr.Res by the
user
SignReward Signature of the aggregate computation that
is used by TA to verify that the Dec.Aggr.Res
is correct
ΠRes Proof of correct decryption of Aggr.Res
VRF.pk,VRF.sk Ephemeral public-private key pair for players
to participate in the draw
𝜖 Random seed to generate random numbers
MAX.DRAW Boundary for selecting consensus participants
VRF.Rand Random number
ΠVRF Proof of randomness based on VRF
pkT Threshold public key generated in a distributed
way by the consensus participants
skT,𝑖 Share 𝑖 of the threshold private key
Dec.Share𝑖 Result of partial decryption using skT,𝑖
Aggr.Clicks Value of the aggregate clicks by all users
Table 2: Summary of our cryptographic notation.
server (maintained by the CM) the most recent version of a
vector, namely ad catalog, that includes ads from all active
ad-campaigns and the name of the advertiser who created it.
The ad-matching happens locally based on a pre-trained
model and the user’s interests extracted from their web brows-
ing history in a similar way as in [23, 24]. Zero data leaves
the user’s device, thus creating a walled garden of browsing
data that are used for recommending the best-matching ad
while user privacy is guaranteed.
The idea of prefetching ads is not new [24, 25, 55, 60,
61]. Studies have shown that prefetching ads in bulk for
smartphone users is not only practical but can reduce energy
consumed during ad transactions by more than 50% [62].
4.1.2 Incentives for Ad-viewing
Following the paradigm of existing academic and corporate
user rewarding schemes [23, 63, 64], in THEMIS, we compen-
sate users for the attention they pay to ad impressions, thus
incentivizing them to interact with ads. Already launched ad
rewarding schemes increased the user engagement, providing
this way high click-through-rates (i.e., 14% on average [28])
to the served ads.
In THEMIS, each viewed/clicked ad yields a reward (this
can be fiat money, crypto-coins, coupons, etc.). Different ads
may provide different amount of reward to the users. This
amount is agreed by the corresponding ad creator (i.e., the
advertiser) and the CM. The reward claiming takes place
periodically (e.g., every 2 days, every week or every month)
when the user requests their reward for the ads they interacted
with. In Figure 1, we present an overview of the reward
defining and claiming procedure of this straw-man approach.
Advertiser Campaign 
Manager
User
(1) Ad policies agreement
Privacy preserving  
ad-matching
User interacts with ads 
and creates an interaction 
vector ac  
Campaign Manager 
creates a vector P with 
the agreed policies
User downloads ad catalog
(2a) User sends encrypted ac
(2b) Campaign Manager 
calculates encrypted aggregate
Campaign Manager sends signed 
and encrypted the aggregated result
(2c) User decrypts result 
and generates proof of 
correct decryption
(3a) User requests payment
(3c) Campaign Manager 
transfers rewards to the user
(3b) Campaign Manager 
verifies the validity of the 
payment request
Figure 1: High-level overview of the user rewards claiming
procedure of our straw-man approach. Advertisers can set
how much they reward each ad click without disclosing that
to competitors. The user can claim rewards without exposing
which ads they interacted with.
Phase 1: Defining Ad Rewards: In order for an advertiser to
have their ad campaign included in the next version of the ad
catalog, they first need to agree with the CM on the policies
of the given campaign (i.e., rewards per ad, ad impressions
per user, etc.) (step 1 in Figure 1). Then, the CM encodes the
agreed policy as a vector 𝒫, where each index corresponds to
the amount of tokens that an ad yields when viewed/clicked
(e.g., Ad 1: 0.4 coins, Ad 2: 2 coins, Ad 3: 1.2 coins). The
CM stores this vector privately and the advertiser needs to
trust that the policies are respected. The indices used in 𝒫
are aligned with the ones of the ad catalog.
For the sake of simplicity, throughout this section, we
consider one advertiser who participates in our ad platform
and runs multiple ad campaigns. Of course, in a real world
scenario many advertisers can participate running many ad
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campaigns simultaneously. We also consider as “agreed poli-
cies” the amount of coins an ad provides as reward to a
clicking user.
Phase 2: Claiming Ad Rewards: The user on their end, create
locally an interaction vector where information is noted about
the number of times each ad of the catalog was viewed/clicked
(e.g., Ad 1: was viewed 3 times, Ad 2: was viewed 0 times,
Ad 3: was viewed 2 times). In every payout period, the user
encrypts the state of the interaction vector. More technically,
let ac be the interaction vector containing the number of
views/clicks of users with each ad, where element 𝑖 of vector
ac represents the number of times ad 𝑖 was viewed/clicked.
On every payout period, the user generates a new ephemeral
key pair pk, sk, to ensure the unlinkability of the payout
requests. By using this key, they encrypt each entry of ac:
EncVec =
[︀
Encryptpk, n1, . . . ,Encryptpk, n𝑛𝐴
]︀
(3)
and send EncVec to the CM (step 2a in Figure 1).
CM cannot decrypt the received vector and thus cannot
learn the user’s ad interactions (and consequently their in-
terests). Instead, they leverage the additive homomorphic
property of the underlying encryption scheme (as described
in Section 2.2) to calculate the sum of all payouts based on
the interactions encoded in EncVec (step 2b in Figure 1).
More formally, the CM computes the aggregate payout for
the user as follows:
Aggr.Res = 𝑁
𝑖=1
𝒫
[︀
𝑖
]︀
· EncVec
[︀
𝑖
]︀
, (4)
where 𝒫𝑖 is the ad policy associated with the ad in the position
𝑖 of the vector. Then CM signs the computed aggregate result:
SignReward = Sig.SignAggr.Res, skCM (5)
and sends the 2-tuple Aggr.Res, SignReward back to the user.
Upon receiving this tuple (step 2c in Figure 1), the user veri-
fies the signature of the result: Sig.VerifyAggr.Res, SignReward.
If the signature is not valid, the user can prove to other
participants in the protocol that the CM has misbehaved.
Otherwise, the user proceeds with decrypting the result:
Dec.Aggr.Res = Decryptsk,Aggr.Res. As a final step, it proves
the correctness of the performed decryption by creating a
zero knowledge proof of correct decryption: ΠRes.
Phase 3: Payment Request: Finally, the user generates the
payment request and sends the following 4-tuple to the CM
(step 3a in Figure 1):(︀
Dec.Aggr.Res,Aggr.Res, SignReward,ΠRes
)︀
(6)
As a next step (step 3b in Figure 1), the CM verifies that the
payment request is valid. More technically, CM will reject
the payment request of the user if
Sig.VerifypkCM,SignReward,Aggr.Res = ⊥ (7)
or
VerifyΠRes = ⊥ (8)
Otherwise, it proceeds with transferring the proper amount
(equal to Dec.Aggr.Res) of reward to the user.
In summary: Till now, we have presented a system which
guarantees that:
(1) The user received the rewards they earned by inter-
acting with ads. This happened without requiring the
user to disclose which ads they clicked on.
(2) CM is able to correctly apply the pricing policy of
each ad without disclosing any information to users or
potential competitors of the advertiser.
4.1.3 Reporting to Advertisers
Apart from providing the users with the proper incentives
to interact with ads, in order to make an ad-platform practi-
cal, feedback about the ad campaigns must be provided to
the advertisers, too. What is more, during billing procedure
they need to be able to verify the integrity of the reported
statistics by the CM regarding the number of times an ad
was viewed/clicked by the users. Based on these statistics,
advertisers get rewarded depending on the times their corre-
sponding ad was clicked throughout the campaign. To achieve
this, whenever a new version of the ad-catalog is online and
retrieved from the users, a new key-pair, pkT, is generated.
This key is used to encrypt a copy of the ac vector CM (Step
2a in Figure 1). Hence, apart from the EncVec illustrated in
Equation 3, each user also sends EncVec’ to the CM, where:
EncVec’ =
[︀
EncryptpkT, n1, . . . ,EncryptpkT, n𝑛𝐴
]︀
The key used here, pkT, is a public threshold key generated in
a distributed way, common to all users. In order to generate
such a key, a pool of multiple participating users2, namely
consensus pool, is created (more details on how the consen-
sus pool is chosen in Section 4.2.3). For this purpose, the
consensus pool runs a Distributed Key Generation (DKG)
algorithm [65]. This results in a shared public key pkT and
each consensus pool participant owning a privacy key share
skT,𝑖. The public key, pkT, is sent to the CM to make it
accessible to all users.
Whenever CM needs to measure the effectiveness of the
current version of the ad catalog, it merges the reported
EncVec’ of every user into a single report. This report includes
the total number of interactions that each ad received by all
users. During this merge, the CM performs homomorphic
addition of all the reported EncVec’, leveraging the fact that
every user used the same key for the encryption:
Aggr.Clicks =
𝑖∈𝑈
EncVec′𝑖 (9)
where 𝑈 is the set of users and EncVec′𝑖 is the vector corre-
sponding to user 𝑖. Then, the CM sends Aggr.Clicks to the
participants of the consensus pool to be decrypted. Each con-
sensus participant 𝑖 responds back with a tuple that includes
(a) its partial decryption:
Dec.Share𝑖 = Part.DecskT,𝑖,Aggr.Clicks (10)
and (b) a proof of correct decryption. As soon as CM col-
lects at least the threshold 𝑘 of such tuples, it verifies the
received proofs and combines all decryption shares together
to fully decrypt the ciphertext. The decrypted vector reveals
the number of times each ad was clicked by all users. This
2Users are incentivized to participate in this pool. Details on how to
orchestrate the incentives are left outside the scope of this paper.
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information is publicly available and is used by advertisers
to validate how much they were charged per ad campaign.
4.2 THEMIS: A Decentralized Ad Platform
In Section 4.1 above, we presented the core functionality of
our ad-platform. We described (i) how the user gets rewarded
for their ad interactions, and (ii) how the advertiser can verify
the integrity of the billing and performance report of their
ad campaigns.
However, the centralization and the lack of auditability of
this straw-man approach creates significant limitations with
respect to the goals and threat model described in Section 3:
∙ Advertisers need to blindly trust the CM with the full
custody of the rewards budget set for each ad campaign.
∙ Users and advertisers have to trust that the CM re-
spects the agreed policies during payouts and transfers
the correct amount of rewards (step 3c in Figure 1).
This means that (similarly to existing approaches [24, 25])
the entire protocol relies on how trustworthy the central
authority (the CM in our straw-man approach) is.
4.2.1 The THEMIS protocol
To address these issues in THEMIS, we leverage a distributed
PoA ledger, where business and payment logic are orches-
trated by smart contracts. All participants of THEMIS can
verify that everyone runs the protocol correctly, thus requir-
ing zero trust from each other. In particular, we define two
smart contracts (See Appendix A for full detail and code):
(1) The Policy Smart Contract (PSC), which is responsible
for the billing of users’ rewards and validating the
payment requests. Furthermore, it is in this smart
contract that Enc 𝒫 is stored.
(2) The Fund Smart Contract (FSC), which receives and
escrows the funds needed to run the campaign. The
FSC is responsible for releasing (i) the funds needed
for the user rewards, (ii) the advertiser refunds, and
(iii) the processing fees for the CF.
In THEMIS, instead of the central trusted authority of the
CM, we introduce the role of a Campaigns Facilitator (CF).
The responsibilities of the CF are to (i) negotiate the policies
(e.g., rewards per ad, impressions per ad) of the advertisers;
(ii) deploy smart contracts in the PoA ledger; and, lastly,
(iii) handle the on-chain payments. In the THEMIS model,
the CF is an authorized entity chosen by the blockchain’s
PoA validators (or part of the consortium), which could be
an independent third party like the EFF [66] or a trustworthy
industry body. Our system ensures that everybody can audit
and verify the behaviour of the different CFs, so advertisers
can pick the CF they prefer to collaborate with based on
their reputation. The CF is incentivized to perform the tasks
required to facilitate the ad catalog, by receiving processing
fees from advertisers.
Phase 1: Defining ad rewards: In Figure 2, we present a high-
level overview of the reward claiming procedure of THEMIS.
Similar to the straw-man approach presented in Section 4.1.2,
in order for an advertiser to include their ad campaign in the
next ad-catalog facilitated by the CF of their preference, they
need to transmit their policies (e.g., reward per ad) to the CF
(step 1a in Figure 2). In order to achieve that, each advertiser
exchanges a symmetric key3 for each ad campaign 𝑆𝑖 with
the CF. It then encrypts the corresponding ad campaign and
sends it together with their ad creatives to the CF. On their
end, the CF (i) decrypt and check the policies are as agreed;
(ii) merge the encrypted policies of the different advertisers
into the encrypted policy vector, Enc 𝒫; and (iii) deploy the
two public smart contracts for this ad-catalog version (step 1b
in Figure 2). In addition, the CF (iv) creates a vector 𝒮 with
all the advertisers’ secret keys 𝑆𝑖:
𝒮 =
[︀
𝒮1,𝒮2, . . . ,𝒮𝑛𝐴
]︀
(11)
and (v) generates a vector, Enc 𝒮, that includes each of the
elements in 𝒮, encrypted with the public key (pk𝒱 ) of the
PoA validator nodes:
Enc 𝒮 =
[︀
Encpk𝒱 ,𝒮1, . . . ,Encpk𝒱 ,𝒮𝑛𝐴
]︀
(12)
Then, the CF (vi) stores Enc 𝒮 in PSC to allow the PoA
validators to decrypt and apply the corresponding policies
on users ad interaction vectors.
Once PSC is deployed, the advertisers must verify if Enc 𝒫
encodes the policies agreed with CF (step 1c in Figure 2).
More specifically:
(1) First, the advertisers fetches Enc 𝒫 vector from the
public storage of the PSC and decrypts the policy,
Enc 𝒫𝑖, using the corresponding symmetric key, 𝒮𝑖,
and verifies it is the agreed value.
(2) Second, they fetch the escrow account address from
FSC and transfer funds to the escrow account. The
amount of funds needed is determined by the number
of impressions they want per ad, its part of the agreed
policy 𝑝𝑖, and the processing fees to pay CF. Once
the campaign is over, the advertisers may get a refund
based to the final number of impressions viewed/clicked
by users. By staking the campaign’s funds, the adver-
tiser is implicitly validating the deployed ad policies.
Once the FSC verifies that advertisers have transferred to the
escrow account the correct amount of funds, the campaign is
initialized and verified.
Phase 2: Claiming ad rewards: Similar to what illustrated
in Section 4.1, in order to claim their ad rewards, each user
creates an ephemeral key pair pk, sk and obtains the public
threshold key pkT generated by the consensus pool (in Sec-
tion 4.2.3, we describe in detail how the consensus pool is
generated). By using these two keys, each user encrypts their
ad interaction vector to generate two ciphertexts: (a) the
EncVec that is used to claim ad rewards and (b) the EncVec’
that is used for the advertisers reporting.
Contrary to our centralized straw-man approach, in
THEMIS, the aggregate calculation is performed via a PSC
(as can be seen in step 2b in Figure 2). Thus, the user calls a
public endpoint on PSC and transmits both ciphertexts. To
3For the creation of this key, they follow the Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol [67]
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Figure 2: High-level overview of the user rewards claiming pro-
cedure in THEMIS. This operation of THEMIS consists of 4
different phases: (1) Definition of Ad Rewards and set policies,
(2) Ad Reward claiming, (3) Payment Request, (4) Settlement
of user payments and advertiser refunds.
calculate the encrypted sum of the rewards the user can claim
(step 2b in Figure 2), a PoA validator runs PSC as follows;
(i) it decrypts each policy 𝒫𝑖 using Enc 𝒮 (here, THEMIS
leverages the private input transactions 2.1); (ii) applies on
EncVec ciphertext the additively-homomorphic property of
the underlying encryption scheme (as shown in Equation 4);
and (iii) stores the result (i.e., Aggr.Res) in the smart contract
public store4.
Phase 3: Payment request: Once the PSC calculated the
aggregate result (step 3 in Figure 2), the user generates a
payment request, ℰ , that, if valid, is published in FSC. More
technically, the user (i) creates an ephemeral blockchain ac-
count (used only once per request) with address Addr and
then (ii) fetches and decrypts Aggr.Res to get the decrypted
reward, Dec.Aggr.Res, and generates the proof of correct de-
cryption, ΠRes. This way, the user (iii) generates the payment
request which consists of the following 3-tuple:
ℰ =
[︀
Dec.Aggr.Res,ΠRes,Addr
]︀
. (13)
Then, (iv) the user calls a public endpoint on PSC with the ℰ
encrypted with the validators keys, Encpk𝒱 , ℰ as input. The
function then fetches the user’s aggregate, Aggr.Res, decrypts
4Given that the user’s public key was used for encrypting EncVec
ciphertext, only them can decrypt Aggr.Res and retrieve ac.
the request, and verifies the zero knowledge proof, ΠRes. If
the proof is valid, it stores Addr in the FSC, which keeps a
list of buffered user payments until marked as paid.
Phase 4: Payment settlement: The final step of the protocol
regards the settlement of the user payment and advertiser
refund.
Specifically, the settlement of the user rewards in THEMIS
needs to happen in a confidential way to preserve the privacy
of the total of earned reward. To achieve this, CF fetches
the pending payments requests from FSC, and calculates the
total amount of funds required to settle all pending payments.
As a next step (step 4a in Figure 2), the CF calls a public
function of FSC requesting to transfer (to an operational
account owned by CF) a given amount of tokens needed to
cover the payments. If the CF misbehaves (by requesting an
incorrect amount of tokens), it will be detected, and either
advertisers or users will be able to prove its misbehaviour.
Finally, CF settles each of the pending reward payments
by using a confidential payment scheme 2.2. After finalizing
the payments correctly (and if there are no complaints form
either users or advertisers), the CF receives from FSC the
processing fees.
In case of unused staked funds, the advertisers need to
be refunded. To achieve this (step 4c in Figure 2), FSC uti-
lizes the aggregate clicks per ad vector that the consensus
pool has computed during the advertisers reporting (see Sec-
tion 4.1.3). Based on this vector and the agreed rewards, the
FSC proceeds with returning to the advertisers the unused
funds.
4.2.2 Misbehaving Campaigns Facilitator
The CF can cheat in two ways: (1) as it is the entity or-
chestrating the confidential payments, it may send incorrect
rewards to users or (2) it could use its power to send rewards
not only to the user but to other accounts of their control.
Both of these actions may be discovered by either users or
advertisers.
(1) In case of scenario (1) The users can provably challenge
CF for incorrect behaviour by proving that the payment
received does not correspond to the payment request
they generated. To do so, the user calls the FSC to
prove that the amounts received by the private payment
does not correspond to the decrypted aggregate in the
payment request ℰ . We stress that in case a user must
undergo such a scenario, only the aggregate amount
of a single ad-catalog will be disclosed (and not its
interaction with ads).
(2) In case of scenario (2), the escrow account will not have
enough funds, resulting in some advertiser getting a
smaller refund to what is stated in the performance re-
port of their ad campaign (as described in Section 4.1.3).
In this case, the advertiser can prove that the received
refund does not correspond to the amount staked in
Phase 1 (see Section 4.2.1) minus the rewards paid to
users based on the numbers of clicks their ads received.
8
To claim misbehaviour, users and advertisers file the com-
plaint via a public function on FSC (that validates the com-
plaint). If any of the complaints happen, the FSC switches
its state as “failed” and CF will not receive any processing
fees, something that affects their reputation.
4.2.3 Consensus Pool Selection
Throughout our system description, we rely on a consensus
pool to distributedly generate a threshold key-pair that is
used for creating the performance reports of the advertisers’
ad-campaigns. This consensus pool consists of a number
of selected users that have opted-in and a smart contract5
used to orchestrate the process of defining this pool (as
proposed in [38]). Any user can opt-in in the draw to become
a consensus pool participant, and a random subset of all
participating users is selected. Specifically, the smart contract
keeps a time interval during which users who want to opt-in
can register as participants for the draft. After that, the
smart contract utilizes an external oracle to select a random
seed, 𝜖, which is used to generate random numbers.
Every registered user generates an ephemeral Verifiable
Random Functions key-pair, VRF.pk,VRF.sk, and publishes
the public key in the smart contract’s public store. Once the
registration phase is closed, the smart contract calculates a
threshold, MAX.DRAW
MAX.DRAW = ⌊𝑛
𝐿
⌋ * 𝑝 (14)
where L is the size of the drawing pool (formed by all opted-in
users), 𝑛 being the expected number of participants in the dis-
tributed key generation, and 𝑝 being an integer such that Z𝑝 is
the space of random numbers outputted by VRF.RandGen·, ·.
Next, the participating users calculate their corresponding
random number and a proof of correct generation
VRF.Rand,ΠVRF = VRF.RandGenVRF.sk, 𝜖.
All participants with VRF.Rand < MAX.DRAW have passed
the selection step, and proceed to publish VRF.Rand,ΠVRF
in the smart contract. They are then required to proceed
with the distributed key generation step defined in 4.1.3. To
avoid cases where there are not enough participants available
online, in THEMIS the participation in the consensus pool
is incentivised6.
4.3 Implementation Details
We implemented the core components necessary to run the
main THEMIS stages described in the Section 4.2.1. More
specifically, the implemented software supports the Phase 1
(defining ad rewards on the client side), Phase 2 (claiming
ad rewards) and Phase 3 (issuing and verifying the payment
request) of the protocol. We measure the performance and
scalability of THEMIS using this implementation. The source
5We deploy this smart contract in the public Ethereum Main-net; the
number of interactions with the blockchain is small so the gas cost
and latency are minimal.
6The process of accounting and incentivising the participants of the
consensus pool is out of scope of this paper.
code of the client and smart contracts has been made publicly
available in Github [68].
Smart contracts implementation: We implemented the policy
smart contract in Solidity [69]. The cryptographic computa-
tions required to calculate the rewards over encrypted data
and verify the proof of correct decryption leverage the pre-
compiled smart contracts [70]. These pre-compiled smart
contracts implement the addition and scalar multiplication
over the alt_bn128 curve, improving the performance of our
homomorphic operations.
Client-side implementation: We implemented the client
logic in Rust. The client-side implementation leverages
the web3-rust [71] crate to interact with the smart con-
tracts. In addition, we used both curve25519-dalek [72] and
elgamal_ristretto [73] crates to implement the underly-
ing public-key cryptography, and corresponding operations,
required by THEMIS.
5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we set out to explore the performance and
scalability of THEMIS. More specifically, we measure the
execution time of the different components of our system
that include heavy cryptographic operations running in smart
contracts deployed on a single side-chain. In addition, we
measure the execution time of the distributed key generation
and decryption of the consensus pool. Building on these
measurements, we evaluate the overall scalability of THEMIS
and assess how the scalability improves linearly with the
number of parallel deployed side-chains.
In order to measure the performance of the smart contracts
responsible for the on-chain computations and the confiden-
tial payments below, we used the Mjölnir tool [74] to deploy
a Quorum side-chain in a production-like environment. We
deployed a 4x Quorum side-chain on AWS, each node running
on a EC2 t.2xlarge instances, all in the same region and
part of the same subnet. For the purpose of the measure-
ments, the network communication is considered negligible.
This setup can be easily emulated in production by setting up
peering among different AWS Virtual Private Clouds across
validator organizations. The protocol configured for the val-
idator nodes to reach consensus was the Istanbul Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (IBFT) consensus protocol [31].
Client side performance: To generate a payment request,
the client needs to (i) encrypt the interaction array (for our
evaluation, the length of this array is 128 entries), step 2a
in Figure 2, and (ii) decrypt the aggregate and recover the
plaintext (the aggregate is a single decryption), step 3 in
Figure 2. We see from Figure 3 that the overhead to generate
reward requests can be done on a commodity laptop or
mobile device, without impacting user experience and energy
consumption. Similarly, fetching, decrypting and recovering
the reward also produces a low overhead, as can be seen in
Figure 4. Moreover, the payment requests are performed on
the client-side at relatively long intervals (e.g. daily, weekly
or even monthly). Hence, we conclude that the overhead on
the client is negligible.
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Figure 3: The average time it takes for a client to generate a
reward request.
Figure 4: The average time it takes for a client to fetch the
encrypted aggregate, decrypt it, and recover the scalar.
Aggregate Ad Clicks Computation: In THEMIS, a consensus
pool is responsible for computing the aggregated clicks each
ad received by the users in order to assess the performance of
each ad-campaign. In the next experiment, we measure the
overhead THEMIS imposes to the users who participate in
the consensus pool and Figure 5 presents the results for the
different threshold levels and number of participants. The blue
line shows the execution time of distributively generating the
public key and the key shares. For a majority of 80-of-100, the
distributed key generation process takes 11.4 seconds. This
considers the upper bound as we assumed that participants
perform their tasks one after the other. In practice, these tasks
are executed in parallel. Note, that this computation has to
be performed only once for each version of the ad catalog. The
operation of the provable decryption of the overall aggregate
clicks vector (red line) takes around 1.2 seconds. In addition,
decrypting the overall aggregate vector is required only once
per ad catalog.
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Figure 5: Upper bound of the execution time for the dis-
tributed (i) key generation and (ii) decryption per consensus
pool participating user. In case of 80-of-100, the distributed
key generation process takes 11.4 seconds and it happens once
per ad catalog. The provable decryption time takes 1.2 sec-
onds.
Comparison of the different confidential transaction protocols:
For the settlement of the rewards payments, in THEMIS
we need a confidential transaction protocol to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of the performed user payments.
We set out to compare the performance of the two most pop-
ular such protocols in the context of THEMIS: AZTEC [47]
and Zether [48]. Our goal is to understand how many con-
fidential transactions can be issued per unit of time on a
PoA blockchain and assess whether confidential payments
can constitute a bottleneck to the scalability of THEMIS.
While in Zether the proof validation time increases linearly
with the amount of payments, AZTEC implements a proof
batching mechanism, which enables senders to amortize the
time of proof verification in the smart contract by performing
multiple payments simultaneously. In Figure 6, we measure
the throughput of AZTEC for the different batch sizes. As
we can see, AZTEC in the case of THEMIS can achieve
around 239K payments/day for a batch size of 500 proof
verifications. Contrary to that, we measured the throughput
that Zether achieves and we see that it reaches 10 payments
per minute (or 600 payments per hour, 14,000 payments
per day). This means that for the case of THEMIS, the
throughput of 14,000 confidential payments/day falls short
from our scalability requirements.
In Figure 7, we compare the time it takes for AZTEC and
Zether to finalize payments. As we can see, in case of Zether
the required time increases linearly with the growing number
of payments. On the other hand, in case of AZTEC, this is
constant: 3 seconds, due to its batching feature. Our mea-
surements confirm that we can achieve scalable confidential
payments in the context of THEMIS by leveraging AZTEC.
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Figure 6: Confidential payments per day for the different
batch sizes while using the AZTEC protocol. The through-
put reaches more than 239K payments/day for a batch size
of 500 proofs.
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Figure 7: Required time for AZTEC and Zether to finalize
payments. In Zether the processing time increases linearly
with the growing number of payments. On the other hand, in
AZTEC, this is constant, 3 seconds.
5.1 System Scalability
We measured the performance and scalability of the reward
calculation phase of THEMIS. More specifically, we measure
the time it takes for the client and smart contract to partici-
pate in the THEMIS protocol, and to calculate the ad reward
and verify the proofs of correct behaviour respectively.
To that end, we have setup a testing environment that
starts 50 concurrent clients. The clients interact with the
smart contracts at roughly the same time. The clients request
a reward calculation over a catalog of 128 ads. Using this
setup, we measure the time it takes for individual clients
to complete the reward calculation, proof verification and
end-to-end performance of the protocol.
Figure 8 shows the accumulated time in seconds for differ-
ent phases of the reward calculation by the client and smart
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Figure 8: Cumulative time (in seconds) for the different phases
of the THEMIS protocol with 50 concurrent clients requesting
the reward computation from the smart contract.
contract, with an ad catalog of size 128. The results show
that:
(1) It takes about 17 seconds for the client to request the
reward calculation and retrieve the encrypted aggregate
from the smart contract.
(2) It takes about 18 seconds for performing (i), and for
the client to decrypt the aggregate and perform the
plaintext recovery locally;
(3) Finally, it takes about 20 seconds for the client and
the smartEVM to perform (ii) and for the client to
submit the decrypted aggregate and proof of correct
decryption and, finally, for the smart contract to verify
the correctness of the user input.
We conclude that when 50 users concurrently request a reward
from the slide-chain, it takes around 20 seconds to complete
the protocol per client, using an ad catalog of 128 ads. In
terms of overall scalability, we conclude that THEMIS can
process about 7 Million users reward requests per month.
5.2 Horizontal Scaling and Multiple Side-chains
We see although the computations performed in smart con-
tracts of THEMIS are highly parallelizable, the one-threaded
event loop of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)7 cannot
support parallel and concurrent computations, thus becoming
a scalability bottleneck.
To overcome this shortcoming we envision THEMIS op-
erating on top of multiple parallel side-chains that will be
responsible for one or more ad catalogs each. Although this
could increase coordination complexity, the scalability gains
are considerable as the number of ads processed grows lin-
early with the number of side-chains supporting this way
simultaneously billions of users.
7The EVM is the run-time virtual machine where the smart contract
instructions are executed in each of the validator’s machine.
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6 Related Work
The current advertising ecosystem abounds with issues associ-
ated with its performance, its transparency, the user’s privacy
and the integrity of billing and reporting. These failures are
already well studied and there are numerous works aiming
to shed light on how digital advertising works [20, 75–80].
Apart from the studies highlighting the failures of cur-
rent ad delivery protocols there are also important novel ad
systems proposed. In [81], Juels is the first to study private
targeted advertising. Author proposes a privacy-preserving
targeted ad delivery scheme based on PIR and Mixnets. In
this scheme, advertisers choose a negotiant function that
assigns the most fitting ads in their database for each type of
profile. The proposed scheme relies on heavy cryptographic
operations and therefore it suffers from intensive computation
cost. Their approach focuses on the private distribution of
ads and does not take into account other aspects such as
view/click reporting.
In [25], authors propose Adnostic: an architecture to en-
able users to retrieve ads on the fly. Adnostic prefetches n
ads before the user starts browsing and stores them locally.
Aside from the performance benefits of this strategy, Adnos-
tic does this prefetching also in order to preserve the privacy
of the user. The parameter n is configurable: larger n means
better ad matching, when smaller n means less overhead. In
order for the ad-network to correctly charge the correspond-
ing advertisers, Adnostic performs secure billing by using
homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs.
In [24, 82, 83], authors propose Privad: an online ad system
that aims to be faster and more private than today’s ad
schema. Privad introduces an additional entity called Dealer.
The Dealer is responsible for anonymizing the client so as to
prevent the ad-network from identifying the client and also
handle the billing. To prevent the Dealer from accessing user’s
behavioral profile and activity it encrypts the communications
between the client and the Dealer. A limitation of Privad is
that Dealer is a centralized entity that needs to be always
online.
In [84], authors propose ObliviAd: a provably secure and
practical online behavioral advertising architecture that relies
on a secure remote co-processor (SC) and Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) to provide the so called secure hardware-based PIR.
In ObliviAd, to fetch an ad, a user first sends their encrypted
behavioral profile to the SC which securely selects the ads
that match best based on the algorithm specified by the ad
network. To prevent the ad-network from learning which ads
are selected, they leverage an ORAM scheme. The selected
ads are finally sent to the user encrypted, along with fresh
tokens used to billing. User will send back one of these tokens
as soon as they view/click on an ad.
In [26] authors point out that, in current advertising sys-
tems the ad-network exclusively determines the payment to
get from advertisers and the revenue to share with publishers.
This means that (i) a malicious ad-network can overcharge
advertisers or underpay publishers. To make matters worse,
as bills cannot be justified by the ad-network, malicious ad-
vertisers can deny actual views/clicks to ask for refund. On
the other hand, (ii) malicious publishers may claim clicks
that did not happen, in order to demand higher revenues.
To address this problem of unfairness, authors propose a
protocol where the ad click reports are encrypted by the user
using the public key of the ad-network and signed by both
publishers and advertisers.
In [61], authors propose CAMEO: a framework for mobile
advertising that employs intelligent and proactive prefetch-
ing of advertisements. CAMEO uses context prediction, to
significantly reduce the bandwidth and energy overheads,
and provides a negotiation protocol that empowers applica-
tions to subsidize their data traffic costs by “bartering” their
advertisement rights for access bandwidth from mobile ISPs.
In [85], authors propose a location-aware, personalised
and private advertising system for mobile platforms. In this
system, ads are locally broadcast to users within mobile cells.
The ad matching happens locally based on the user interests.
Finally ad view and click reports are collected using a DTN
system. In [86], authors propose a new ad protocol that
uses homomorphic and searchable encryption to allow users
transmit mobile sensor data to a cloud service that responds
back with the best matching contextual advertisements.
In [87], the authors present VEX, a protocol for ad ex-
changes to run low-latency and high-frequency ad auctions
that are verifiable and auditable, in order to prevent fraud in
a context where parties participating in the auction – bidders
and ad exchanges – may not know each other. Based on
their evaluation of the system, the authors claim that the
additional storage required and latency imposed by VEX are
low and practical in the context of ad auctions.
In [88] the authors present and implement PROTA, a
privacy-preserving protocol for real-time advertising which
uses keywords to match users interests with ads. By using
bloom filters, the authors make the ad matching task efficient.
The protocol relies on a trusted third party to cooperate
with the ad exchange during the bidding and ad delivering
phase. The authors implement and evaluate the protocol,
and conclude that the time upper bond for matching ads is
200ms, which is considerable practical in the context of an
ad matching system.
In [89], the authors present and evaluate a system that aims
at providing high-quality ad targeting in multiple scenarios,
while giving the user the ability to control their privacy. The
system consists of tailored extensions that mine the user
behaviour locally with low overhead. The extensions generate
user behavioural data that can be shared with advertisers
without leaking undesirable user information. Similarly to
THEMIS, the authors discuss how the system can be used by
users and advertisers, and how it can be used as a replacement
for the tracking-based business model in the online advertising
industry.
In [90], the authors set out to formalize the concept of
privacy in the context of the online advertising ecosystem
and to develop a provably secure privacy-preserving proto-
col for the online advertising ecosystem. While the authors
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claim that the definition of privacy presented in the paper is
more useful compared to previous work in the online adver-
tising context, their attempts to develop a provably secure
privacy-preserving protocol has failed due to being hard to
balance privacy with usefulness of the user data. The authors
conjecture that cryptographic mechanisms have the poten-
tial to solve the privacy versus data usefulness conundrum.
Using applying cryptography is the basis of how THEMIS
proposes to preserve privacy when calculating ad rewards,
providing advertisers with campaign metrics and performing
confidential payments to users.
Towards a similar direction with the user rewarding schema
of THEMIS, in [63] authors propose a privacy-aware frame-
work to promote targeted advertising. In this framework, an
ad broker responsible for handling ad targeting, sits between
advertisers and users and provides certain amount of com-
pensation to incentivize users to click ads that are interesting
yet sensitive to them.
In [64], authors propose a targeted advertising framework
which enables users to get compensated based on the amount
of user tracking they sustain and the privacy they lose. The
authors analyze the interaction between the different parties
in the online advertising context — advertisers, the ad broker
and users — and propose a framework where the interactions
between the different parties are a positive-sum game. In
this game, all parties are incentivized to behave according to
what other parties expect, achieving an equilibrium where
everyone benefits. More specifically, the users determine their
click behaviour based on their interested and their privacy
leakage, which in turn will influence the advertisers and ad
broker to provide less invasive and better ads. THEMIS
relies on a similar game theoretical approach. By providing
compensation for good behaviour while providing the verifi-
cation mechanisms for all parties to audit whether everyone
is behaving according to the protocol, the incentives to cheat
and misbehave are lower.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented THEMIS: a private-by-design,
trustless, and decentralized ad-platform. THEMIS (i) is au-
ditable and transparent, it (ii) rewards the users for their
interactions with ads, (iii) ensures the integrity of the billing
and campaign performance reports of the advertisers, and
(iv) requires zero trust from its participants.
We implemented our approach by leveraging a permis-
sioned blockchain with smart contracts as well as zero-
knowledge schemes. We measured the efficiency of our encryp-
tion scheme in the Solidity language; since our system sup-
ports batching of on-chain proof validations, it can serve more
than 7M concurrent users during monthly reward payouts,
while using a catalog of 128 ads. The number of concurrent
users can be scaled linearly with more side-chains.
While many companies have proposed the use of blockchain
for online advertising, we believe that THEMIS is the first
system that delivers on that promise. Given the practicality
of the approach and the combination of security, privacy, and
performance properties it delivers, THEMIS can be used as a
foundation of a radically new approach to online advertising.
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Appendices
A Smart Contracts
In this section, we specify the functionalities and properties
of the smart contracts necessary to run THEMIS. In practice
and at the EVM level, the policy smart contract logic and
fund smart contract logic may be split into multiple smart
contracts, but for the sake of simplicity, we describe the logic
as part of two smart contracts per THEMIS campaign: (i)
the Policy Smart Contract (Figure 9), and (ii) the Fund
Smart Contract (Figure 10). We assume that both smart
contracts have access to storage of the 𝐶𝐹 ’s public key and
the consensus participants public key (when generated).
A.1 Policy Smart Contract
Public data structures: The Policy Smart Contract (PSC)
keeps its state in three public data structures: an array with
the encrypted ad policies (Enc 𝒫), an array containing all
rewards aggregates (Agg) calculated by the smart contract,
and an array of encrypted symmetric keys, Enc 𝒮, used to en-
crypt the policies. The latter allows the validators to decrypt
the policies and apply them to the aggregate requests.
StorePolicy(): This private function can be called only by
the account which deployed the smart contract, i.e., by the
Campaign Facilitator (CF). The function receives an array
of uint265 types – which represent the encrypted ad policies
for the campaign agreed with the advertisers (Phase 1 in
4.2.1) – and it initializes the public (Enc 𝒫) data structure
with its input. Each policy is encrypted using a symmetric
key agreed between the CF and the corresponding advertiser.
ComputeAggregate(): It is a public function that is exposed
to the users. Users call this function with an array containing
their encrypted interactions (Phase 2 in 4.2.1). The smart
contract proceeds to calculate the reward aggregate based on
the user input and the ads policies (Enc 𝒫). The aggregate
is stored in the (Agg) data structure, which is accessible to
all users.
GetAggregate(): It is a public function which receives an
ID (i.e., uint265) and returns the encrypted aggregate in-
dexed by the respective ID in the Agg data structure. This
function is used by users to fetch the encrypted aggregate
calculated by the smart contract, after having called the
ComputeAggregate() function described above.
PaymentRequest(): It is a public function which receives
an encrypted payment request from users (Phase 3 in 4.2.1)
under the validators’ key. If the payment request is valid,
the smart contract buffers the request in the Fund Smart
Contract (PaymentReq). The buffered payments are settled
periodically by CF.
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A.2 Fund Smart Contract
Public data structures: The Fund Smart Contract (FSC)
keeps it state in multiple public data structures. The Init
parameter represents whether the ad campaign has started.
In order for the Init to turn to be marked as initialized
(i.e., 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒), all campaign advertisers – which are kept in Advs
– must confirm their participation by depositing the funds
(to the ad campaign’s escrow account ℱ) necessary to cover
their ad campaign in the smart contract account. In addition,
the FSC keeps a list of all payment requests triggered by
PSC and the successfully payed requests PayedReq. Finally
it stores the agreed processing fees of the CF, and a value of
the overall ad interaction, Aggr.Clicks, which is updated by
the consensus pool.
StoreAdvID(): Private function that can be called by the CF
to add new advertisers to the campaign. If the campaign has
not started (i.e., Init : 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒), the advertisers ID is added
to the Advs list. No new advertisers can be added after a
campaign has started.
StoreAggrClicks(): This public function has an access con-
trol policy that only a value signed by the consensus partici-
pants will update the public data structure. It is a function
that is used to update the state of the smart contract overall
ad interactions, Aggr.Clicks.
StoreFunds(): Public function called by the advertisers
upon transferring the campaign funds to the FSC account.
When all the advertisers have transferred the funds necessary
to cover their ad campaign, the smart contract updates its
state to Init : 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒.
InitialiseCampaign(): Private function that is only called
by the smart contract. It sets Init : 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒.
SettlementRequest(): This public function has an access
control policy that only the CF can successfully call it. It
requests the release of funds to the CF account, in order for
the CF to be able to have the funds for settling the buffered
payment requests (in PSC).
RefundAdvertisers(): This function is called internally by
the FSC and it is triggered either when: 1) all the ads in the
campaign have been "spent" by the users or 2) when a pre-
defined epoch has passed, signaling the end of the campaign.
This function releases the funds to the advertisers, based on
the Aggr.Clicks per advertiser in the campaign.
PayProcessingFees(): This function is – alongside with
RefundAdvertisers() – called when the campaign is finished.
It verifies if the CF has behaved correctly and pays the fees
to the CF’s account.
RaiseComplaint(): This public function allows users to
prove that the CF misbehaved. In order to cull such a function,
users must prove that their corresponding aggregate does
not correspond to the private payment they received. To this
end they disclose the aggregate value they were expecting to
earn. This will prove that the CF misbehaved and the smart
contract can flag the latter as such.
Policy Smart Contract
Public Storage
– Enrypted agreed policies Enc 𝒫 :
[︀]︀
– Aggregates Agg:
[︀]︀
– Encrypted keys used to encrypt the ad policies: Enc 𝒮 :
[︀]︀
StorePolicy
Inputs: Encrypted policy, Enc 𝒫𝑖.
(1) Set Enc 𝒫
[︀
𝑖
]︀
= Enc 𝒫𝑖
StoreEncryptedKeys
Inputs: Encrypted keys, Enc 𝒮*, and signature, 𝜎 of the call
(1) Verify 𝜎 with the CF’s public key, CF.pk.
(2) Set Enc 𝒮 = Enc 𝒮*
ComputeAggregate
Inputs: the user’s public key pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 , and the encrypted ad inter-
action, Enc.Ad.
(1) Require lengthEnc.Ad == lengthEnc 𝒫
(2) Decrypt the encrypted keys
𝒮 =
[︀
Dec
(︀
sk𝒱 , Enc 𝒮𝑖
)︀]︀𝑁
𝑖=1
(3) Use these keys to decrypt all entries of Enc 𝒫
𝒫 =
[︀
Dec
(︀
𝒮𝑖, Enc 𝒫𝑖
)︀]︀𝑁
𝑖=1
(4) Store aggregate
Agg
[︀
pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
]︀
=
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝒫
[︀
𝑖
]︀
· EncVec
[︀
𝑖
]︀
GetAggregate
Inputs: the user’s public key pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
(1) Return Agg
[︀
pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
]︀
PaymentRequest
Inputs: The user’s public key, pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 , decrypted aggregate, proof
of decryption, and the address receiving the payment:
ℰ =
[︀
pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟,Dec.Aggr.Res, SignReward, ΠRes,Addr
]︀
encrypted under the validators key, Encpk𝒱 , ℰ
(1) Get the encrypted aggregate related to the public key,
Agg
[︀
pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
]︀
(2) Decrypt the encrypted payment request, to get ℰ
(3) Verify SignReward with CF’s public key, CF.pk. If it validates,
then;
(4) Verify proof of decryption 𝑉 = ΠRes.Verif. If 𝑉 = ⊤, append
Addr to the payment request PaymentReq variable of the Fund
Smart Contract.
Figure 9: Description of the public storage and functionality
of the Policy Smart Contract (PSC)
ClaimInsufficientRefund(): This public function allows
advertisers to prove they have received insufficient refunds.
To this end, advertisers simply call this function which au-
tomatically checks the validity of the claim. If the claim is
valid, it flags the CF as misbehaving.
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Fund Smart Contract
Public Storage
– Campaign initialised, Init : 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
– Advertisers list, Advs:
[︀]︀
– Ad campaign’s escrow account, ℱ :
[︀]︀
– Agreed processing fees, 𝜔
– Payment request, PaymentReq :
[︀]︀
– Payed requests, PayedReq :
[︀]︀
– Overall ad interactions, Aggr.Clicks : 0
StoreAdvID
Inputs: Advertiser’s id Advs𝑖𝑑 that has agreed an ad policy with
CF
(1) Append to the advertisers list, the advertiser’s id
Advs=Advs‖Advs𝑖𝑑
StoreAggrClicks
Inputs: Number of ad clicks performed by all users, Aggr.Clicks′
and signature of the value 𝜎.
(1) Verify 𝜎 with Con.Part public key. If it validates, then
(2) Set Aggr.Clicks = Aggr.Clicks′
StoreFunds
Inputs: Fund for the campaign, ℱ𝑖𝑑 which is determined by the
number of impressions the advertiser wants per ad, the agreed
policies and the processing fees. And the advertiser’s ID, Advs𝑖𝑑.
(1) Store fund in escrow account ℱ
[︀
𝑖𝑑
]︀
= ℱ𝑖𝑑
(2) If ℱ contains funds from all advertisers in Advs, call
InitialiseCampaign
InitialiseCampaign
(1) Set Init = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
SettlementRequest
Input: amount, 𝜏 , and a signature of the request, 𝜎
(1) Verify 𝜎 with CF public key, CF.pk. If it validates, then;
(2) Send 𝜏 to CF’s account.
PaymentProcessed
Input: reference of the private transaction, TxRef to address Addr
(1) Check existence of TxRef, if it exists,
(2) Add Addr to PayedReq
(3) If PayedReq == PaymentReq, then call
PayProcessingFees(𝜔) and
RefundAdvertisers(Advs,Aggr.Clicks)
RefundAdvertisers
Input: list of advertisers, Advs, and total value of aggregate
clicks, Aggr.Clicks.
(1) If ℱ
[︀
𝑖𝑑
]︀
is greater than the amount "spent" during the
campaign, refund the corresponding amount to Advs𝑖𝑑.
(2) If ℱ
[︀
𝑖𝑑
]︀
is smaller than the amount "spent", request
payment to Advs𝑖𝑑.
PayProcessingFees
Input: agreed processing fees for the campaign, 𝜔, between CF
and advertisers.
(1) Pay 𝜔 to CF’s account.
RaiseComplaint
Input: user’s public key, pk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟, reference to private payment,
𝑡𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 , and the opening of the latter, 𝑟, 𝑙, where 𝑟 is the hiding
value and 𝑙 the payment amount.
(1) Verify that 𝑡𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 corresponds to a transaction with 𝑟, 𝑙.
If yes,
(2) Fetch the payment request of the user, PaymentReqpk𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
(3) Decrypt the request to extract the aggregate
(4) If 𝑙 does not correspond to the amount fetched, flag
the CF as dishonest and append the proof, i.e. the de-
crypted aggregate and private payment opening of the
corresponding user.
ClaimInsufficientRefund
Input: advertiser’s id, Advs𝑖𝑑.
(1) Fetch the funds submitted by the advertiser, ℱAdvs𝑖𝑑
(2) Fetch the number of views received by the ads of the
advertisers, and multiply them by the agreed policy value,
to compute the total amount spent by the advertiser
Sp =
𝑖∈𝑆
𝒫𝑖 * Aggr.Clicks𝑖
where 𝑆 is the set of all ads corresponding to advertiser
Advs𝑖𝑑.
(3) If Sp plus the refund paid to the advertiser does not
correspond to ℱAdvs𝑖𝑑, flag the CF as dishonest.
Figure 10: Description of the public storage and functionality of the Fund Smart Contract (FSM)
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